Examining How First-Round Trade-Ups Have Panned out for Broncos Since 2011
The 2020 NFL Draft is just days away and reports suggest that the Denver Broncos are prepared to trade up to ensure they get a player they want. Woody Paige, who has good insights into what goes on with the Broncos, has predicted WR Jerry Jeudy is the target.
There are those who have debated whether it's a smart idea to trade up to get a player and asked the question about how often it has worked out for the team moving up. But I wonder if we may be asking the wrong question.
I believe a better question to ask is...
That's why, in previous articles, I've considered who are the best trading partners for the Broncos to visit with, to ensure GM John Elway doesn't give up too much draft capital.
But I decided to look at past trades up the board to see if they worked out or not, to at least answer the question about whether or not the odds favor a move up the board. Then I examined another question...
Let's start with all trades up the board in the first and second rounds from 2011-18. I started with 2011 because, with the rookie pay scale in place, it changed the value of draft picks.
With cost-controlled contracts and fifth-year options in place for first-round picks, they became more valuable to teams. It also made more sense to trade back into the first round by sending your second-round pick that year as part of a deal.
Also, I didn't include 2019 because the jury is still out on those players — though I will discuss at least one trade later in the article when I examine what picks were sent to another team in a move up the board.
I focused on the first two rounds only because the talk has been that the Broncos will either trade up from No. 15 overall or, failing that, could trade back into the first round. I also left open the possibility that the Broncos could trade up in the second round, failing an attempt to trade back into the first round.
I then considered whether the player proved to be worth the pick, based on whether or not he was or is a candidate for a long-term deal beyond his rookie contract. Such players who proved worthy got a 'yes' while those who didn't got a 'no'.
However, there were a few cases I judged 'debatable' from factors ranging from a player being traded before his deal expired and netted a good return, to a player perhaps not becoming as big of a contributor as expected.
I won't go over every draft in detail, but will give you 2011 as an example. The players taken in trades up the board I judged 'yes' were Julio Jones and Colin Kaepernick, with those judged 'no' being Blaine Gabbert, Phil Taylor, Ben Ijalana, Brandon Harris, Daniel Thomas and Mikel Leshoure, with Mark Ingram judged 'debatable'.
My tallies of trades up the board from 2011-18 showed that teams found a player worth taking with the pick 23% of the time, with 19% of the picks classified as 'debatable' and the remaining 58% not working out as expected. That nearly 60% of the players teams traded up for didn't live up to expectations certainly makes it seems risky to move up.
Of course, it would help to compare that to how often picks worked out for teams when they stayed put or traded down. Furthermore, there have been more trades that worked out in the past couple of years.
2017 and 2018 had the most moves up the board that worked out, with five in each year. And with four moves up in 2018 that would be 'debatable' at this point, those could change if any of those players break out in 2020, meaning more of those moves became worth it.
But this still begs the question: How much should a team give up in a move up the board?
First, I'll remind everyone about how I believe teams should view their draft picks under the rookie pay scale. They are, by round:
Round 1: Long-term starter worth extending beyond his rookie deal, with higher picks needing to be impact players.
Round 2: Short-term starter who is a candidate for an extension, but might not be extended if another player proves more worthy.
Round 3: Contributor for at least two seasons, but may not be extended giving cap constraints.
Round 4: Good depth player who is worth extending as such.
Rounds 5-7: Depth at best, may not even make the roster.
You can argue for exceptions in the later rounds, but most of them aren't going to be premium positions, and those you do draft may not get extended. And for those insisting all picks need to be true hits, remember that late-round players are called 'steals' for a reason, meaning players that hit in those rounds are the exception, not the rule.
When you move up in the first round, you are always giving up the first-round selection you have. But giving up an additional first-round pick means you are betting on future draft capital that could be used toward a long-term starter.
If you give up a second-round pick, you are betting on a pick that might go toward a short-term starter. Apply the same logic to how I view other picks.
For a move back into the first round, a second-round choice gets included, so you are betting on giving up a potential short-term guy for a potential long-term guy, which isn't a bad idea. Of course, your move up the board gets judged further with the additional pick you include.
We can apply the same logic to a move up in the second round, in which you most often give up the second-round choice you already have. A move back into the second round often includes a third-round pick in the current year, so you are betting a pick for a contributor who might not get extended for a pick used on somebody who you have an expectation to extend.
Knowing this criteria I've outlined for picks and what you are betting with picks you send in a trade, let's look at the Broncos' trades up the board in the first and second rounds and see what they gave up.
2016: We all know that Paxton Lynch was a bust. However, GM John Elway only included a third-round pick along with his first-rounder to move up in the first. He had two third-round picks and more picks on top of that, so he didn't leverage a lot of his draft capital to make the move. Had he given up a future first-rounder just to move five or six spots, that would have been a bad move to go along with a draft bust.
It's easy to point to Justin Simmons being a good pick and say that the Broncos should have kept the third-rounder, then pick another player, but then you get to use hindsight bias to choose your player. In reality, Elway did a good job of hedging his bets here, even if Lynch was a bust.
2015: Again, Shane Ray didn't work out, but consider that Elway, in moving up the first round, gave up two fifth-rounders (one in 2015 and one in 2016), with which the expectation was that they would be depth players at best and might not even make the active roster.
Plus Elway sent a player he wasn't planning to keep (Manuel Ramirez), he had plenty of draft capital to work with, and was set to get compensatory picks in 2016 to make up for the pick he sent in the trade. Ray might not have panned out, but I see little reason to grumble about the move up the board.
2014: Here, Elway moved up in the second round to get Cody Latimer, another player who didn't work out. Along with his own second-rounder, Elway sent a fifth-round pick that year and a 2015 fourth-round pick. I would say, in terms of capital given up, this was the worst move Elway ever moved up the board, though it's not necessarily bad. The Broncos did gain additional picks for 2015, so it didn't leave the team short on draft capital.
2019: Though I didn't include 2019 draft trades up the board in analyzing how many worked out, let's consider the move for Drew Lock, in which Elway sent his own second-round pick, plus fourth- and sixth-rounders, to move up in the second round. In this case, Elway bet on Lock being worth giving up on potential depth players and, with the sixth-rounder, a player who might not make the team. Obviously, this move will look like a genius move if it works out, but I do think Elway did the best he could to hedge his bets.
In short, Elway didn't sacrifice too much draft capital in his moves up the board and didn't leverage the future too much. Even when players didn't work out, it didn't leave Elway in a jam with little draft capital remaining.
The Bolder the Move, the Bolder the Risk
The real problem comes when you are making bold moves up the board or giving up too much capital just to move one or two spots higher in a round. Sometimes these moves don't become evident until further down the road, when you have the time to evaluate how a good player really is.
Case in point is Jared Goff, a quarterback who has shown good play at times but is clearly not a game-changer. He needs lots of help, but the Rams gave up a lot of capital when they moved up to the No. 1 overall pick in 2016, thus expecting him to be a game-changer.
The Rams sent that year's first, second, and third-round draft choices, plus a future first and future third, though they got fourth and sixth-round picks in 2016 back. In other words, they gambled that Goff would be worth sacrificing several picks that could have been used to build the team around him, and in some cases, players worth extending after their rookie deals expired. And history has shown that Goff is the type of quarterback who needs lots of quality players around him in order to succeed.
And then there's the more infamous example of the Bears trading up in 2017 for Mitchell Trubisky, moving up just one spot and sending that year's third and fourth-round picks, plus a future third, along with their own first-rounder. Trubisky failing to live up to expectations certainly doesn't help, but the Bears leveraged a lot of capital just to move one spot up the board. That's not a good job of hedging your bets.
The Browns had a similar issue when they included fifth, sixth and seventh-round picks to move up one spot in the first round to select RB Trent Richardson. While the Browns had a lot of picks, they had gone through multiple years of poor drafting and needed more capital to find players to fill depth. At least the Browns got a first-round pick for Richardson in a trade with the Colts the following year.
There have also been trades up the board for players who play positions that are in no way ones to aggressively pursue. That brings me to another infamous trade in 2016, in which the Buccaneers sent third and fourth-round picks to move back into the second round for a kicker, Roberto Aguayo. There's zero justification for trading up for a kicker — and to make matters worse, Aguayo lasted just a couple of seasons before being cut.
Of course, there are times when it does make sense to roll the dice and give up draft capital that could be utilized on top contributors. There's no question the Chiefs and Texans in 2017 each benefitted by including a future first-rounder in their moves up the board that netted them Patrick Mahomes and DeShaun Watson, respectively.
The same is true with the Ravens when they moved back into the first round in 2018, including that year's second and fourth-round picks, plus a future second-rounder, and got Lamar Jackson. Go back to 2014 and the Cowboys traded back into the second round, sending that year's third-round pick and a future second-rounder to get themselves DE DeMarcus Lawrence.
But some trades up the board can be debatable, in terms of capital given up, even if the player turned out to be good. Julio Jones has been a top-five receiver for most of his NFL career, but the Falcons made a huge leap up the board in 2011 and gave up a future first-rounder, plus that year's second-round pick, as part of the package. Is Jones worth giving up picks for a potential short-term starter and a future long-term starter? Some might say no.
What it Means for Broncos
Elway needs to follow his usual criteria of hedging his bets. He has 10 total picks, with eight in next year's draft and no compensatory picks coming. He should also keep in mind the positions he's looking at when making a move up the board.
Everyone should know that a move up the first round means sending this year's first-round pick, a move back into the first round or a move up the second round means sending this year's second-round pick, and a move back into the second round means sending a third-round pick this year, as part of any package. But what else should be included? Here's how I see it.
Future first-rounder: It's worth it for a quarterback and maybe a pass rusher, but no other position. With QBs, you are betting on the player transforming your entire team. An elite pass rusher can transform your entire defense, though not the entire team. Other positions don't move the needle as much.
Current year second-rounder: Moves up the first round for QBs are certainly worth including this pick. For pass rushers, it makes more sense to do this than send a future first-rounder. For other positions, I could see the argument for a WR, OT or CB, but you better do your homework there. Other positions aren't as valuable to justify including that pick.
Future second-rounder: I think the same logic applies as with a current year second-rounder when it comes to the first round. And I can see more value in sending a future second-rounder in a move back into the second round. However, I'd rather not include a future second-rounder in a move up the second round.
Current year third-rounder: This pick makes more sense to include in moves up the first round, and for some moves up the second round, because a third-round pick isn't likely to be extended and you are pursuing a player who you have higher expectations for extending.
That's why I'd be fine with the Broncos sending a third-round pick to a team to move up in the first round for either a WR or OT. The Broncos have three available, so why not send one to find a long-term guy, rather than hold onto them all when, even if they turn out to be good players, might be allowed to leave if your first and second-round guys turn out to be candidates for extensions.
Fourth round and later: These picks make sense to include more often than not, though you may want to keep your fourth rounders if your depth isn't good. You also want to make sure you don't include too many picks if you are moving just one or two spots up the board.
Be Wary of the Second-Round Ask
In short, when it comes to the 2020 draft, I'm all for Elway dangling a third-round pick or two to move up in the first round. If he can keep it as one third-rounder and a Day 3 pick, that's even better. But if teams push for any second-round pick, I'm hesitant to make the deal, and I definitely say "no deal" if a team demands a future first-rounder, whether that's for a wide receiver, offensive tackle, cornerback or any other position.
The Broncos don't need a QB, so a future first-rounder in a move up the board is out of the question. But what moves up the board are really about are how much you give up in return to do that.
Hedge your bets and you should be fine, even if the player doesn't work out. But give up too much and you could do more harm than good, even if the player turns into a good one.
Follow Bob on Twitter @BobMorrisSports and @MileHighHuddle.
