Robert Deutsch-USA TODAY Sports
Assessing Dave Gettleman's Two Years as Giants General Manager
After a disappointing two-year period in which the Giants have only managed to win nine games (with one left to play this year, changes are inevitable.
They have to be, whether ownership wants it or not. Something hasn’t been meshing to produce the desired results, and with the disappointing seasons stacking up on top of each other, something has to give.
The obvious something is probably going to be head coach Pat Shurmur and his staff, as a strong argument can certainly be made that the Giants have underachieved in each of Shurmur’s two seasons as head coach.
But what about general manager Dave Gettleman, the principal architect in the last two seasons? Has he done enough to warrant a third season, or is he part of the problem?
Let’s take a candid and thorough look at Gettleman’s body of work with the Giants so far and see what the evidence suggests.
Rebuilding the Roster: The “C” Word
At his introductory press conference, Gettleman vowed to come to work every day and “kick ass.”
He has since wasted no time in doing so, the most prominent “ass-kicking” coming when he completely gutted the Giants roster in the name of rebuilding the culture.
It’s one thing to remove players who clearly don’t want to be with a team, but in retrospect, it’s probably fair to wonder if it was Gettleman’s gutting of the roster was done too quickly.
Yet that is the approach Gettleman took, perhaps figuring that the Giants were losing with players such as Damon Harrison, Olivier Vernon, Landon Collins, and Odell Beckham Jr so they could lose without them.
The problem with that approach was that the Giants didn’t have a replacement of equal or greater talent on the roster and instead rolled the dice on youngsters and retreads picking up the slack.
In some cases, it worked. Markus Golden’s 10.0 sacks have already topped Olivier Vernon’s season totals in each of his three years as a member of the Giants, and youngsters Oshane Ximine and Lorenzo Carter, both tied for second with 5.5 sacks, have shown encouraging signs as pass rushers.
Dexter Lawrence II is a rising young player who has been solid and who can potentially give the Giants a longer tenure than Damon Harrison gave them.
But there are some areas where the jury is still out on whether the “culture” switch is paying off in terms of production, the most glaring one being at receiver, where the Giants took the “village” approach toward replacing Beckham's production.
While one must allow for the fact that the Giants have had Daniel Jones, a rookie, at quarterback for most of the season, the fact remains that through 15 games, the Giants are averaging 230.4 passing yards per game this year versus the 275.3 passing yards per game they averaged in 16 games last year.
While one might counter that the Giants have never had all their receiving targets—receivers Golden Tate and Sterling Shepard, tight end Evan Engram, and running back Saquon Barkley—on the field at the same time, those who were available haven’t quite measured up from a statistic perspective.
Gettleman has often joked in the past about "having to wear a tutu while walking a tightrope" regarding roster decisions that won’t resonate with the fan base and maybe even with ownership.
But this idea of building the perfectly balanced culture in a locker room doesn't mean anything if the desired results aren't there.
Free Agency
If there has been an area where Gettleman has had some notable swings and misses, veteran free agency (not to be confused with undrafted free agency) would be it.
However, not all of his misses can be graded equally.
People will point to left tackle Nate Solder, and how Gettleman overspent on the offensive lineman yet didn’t get a solid return on the results.
One needs to remember that when it comes to free agency, overspending is almost always going to happen, especially at a premium position where a team is desperate to fill.
In this instance, Gettleman had no choice but to overspend after Ereck Flowers famously developed into a bust of epic proportions.
Historically, left tackles have never come cheaply, and Solder, who came from the Patriots organization, was no exception.
That example aside, free agency hasn’t been as solid for Gettleman and the Giants, whose only significant hits in the two years have been safety/special teams captain Michael Thomas and edge rusher Markus Golden.
Gettleman’s biggest misses have come about when he has overspent on players who were familiar to either him from his days at Carolina or who had ties to the coaching staff.
The most significant examples include running back Jonathan Stewart, whom Gettleman had with the Panthers, and outside linebacker Kareem Martin and free safety Antoine Bethea, two throwbacks from defensive coordinator James Bettcher’s heydays with the Arizona Cardinals.
Stewart, who was 31 years old at the time of his signing, got a two-year, $6.8 million contract that had a first-year cap hit of $3.635 million.
Obviously, injuries were a factor, but to dish out that kind of money for a guy who was never going to be a No. 1 running back on this team was a questionable investment.
Martin and Bethea were two signings that were no doubt endorsed by Bettcher, who might have reasoned that having guys who had done it at a high level in Arizona would be excellent additions to help a young defense.
To their credit, the Giants did structure those contracts to give themselves a cost-effective out that won't dump oodles of dead money into future caps.
In the case of Bethea, who signed a 2-year, $6.5 million contract, the Giants have an out after this season that will only cost them $125,000 in dead money. Martin, meanwhile, signed a 3-year, $15 million contract that gives the team a cost-effective out after this season.
However, to say that the Giants have gotten their money’s worth from both players’ on-field performance would not be accurate.
This is where the most significant criticism of Gettleman is applicable. Several of the free-agent signings in Gettleman’s tenure have been used on players with ties to the Cardinals (Bettcher, 5) and Panthers (Gettleman, 5).
While there is something to be said for working with guys with whom one knows, it’s also ill-advised to overspend on those guys just because you "know them."
There is one other aspect of Gettleman’s approach to free agency, which warrants discussion, and that has been the debate to trade versus let pending free agents walk.
Safety Landon Collins is a perfect example. The Giants reportedly had trade offers for Collins last year, but none which were persuasive enough for Gettleman to make the move.
When it came time to commit with a new free agency contract, Collins walked away for what is projected to be a 2020 third-round draft pick that was going to be no help to the Giants in 2019.
Trades
Gettleman’s approach to trading in his two seasons as general manager has been his “no guts, no glory” approach.
For as passive as Jerry Reese was, Gettleman has been the opposite, using trades to fill holes that developed due to the poor drafts and at positions where maybe the draft class hasn't been bountiful.
The advantage of acquiring a veteran via trade is that the acquiring team is only on the hook for the base salaries and workout bonuses, not the prorated signing bonuses, so it can be a cost-effective step to fill in some holes.
The disadvantage is usually you're giving up draft picks that you can potentially use during the draft to move up the board.
Where Gettleman has done well with trades is when he's gotten something for players he was likely planning to cut. Getting guard Kevin Zeitler in exchange for edge Olivier Vernon was a steal. Getting a conditional draft pick for linebacker B.J. Goodson, a player he was going to cut, was a coup.
What about the Beckham trade? Beckham wasn't going to be cut, but that Gettleman managed to get three players, including two high draft picks, eased the sting on the transaction.
The biggest headscratcher was the Leonard Williams trade in which he sent a 2020 third-round pick to the Jets and a conditional fifth-rounder who turns into a fourth if the Giants re-sign Williams to a long-term deal.
That's two draft picks for a player that was going to hit free agency and whom the Giants, projected to have upwards of $60 million in cap space, could have competed for if they wanted him while keeping the draft capital.
The only logic that makes sense here is if the Giants can't re-sign Williams, they'd be eligible for a comp pick in 2021 (assuming that system is still part of the next CBA).
Yes, it's a good backup plan, but if Willaims does walk, knowing that you have a good chance of getting a comp pick for him in 2021 isn't necessarily going to help you in 2020.
What about the non-trades? That the Giants weren't able to get anything for cornerback Janoris Jenkins in a trade is a head-scratcher as well, especially since it was clear after Gettleman added all those young corners that there was little chance of Jenkins being in the picture in 2020.
Draft
Out of 17 draft picks, eight are starters (including Ryan Connelly, who is on IR, and Sam Beal, a supplemental draft pick). Six are rotational types; two are non-factors (George Asafo-Adjei, on IR, and Chris Slayton, on the practice squad), and one (quarterback Kyle Lauletta), is with another team.
If building through the draft is the foundation of creating a winning roster, the Giants appear to be on the right track in this regard, though until each class has been in the league three full years, it's too soon to declare a class a boom or a bust.
The other question to be addressed is if the draft picks have reached their potential. Again, it takes a full three years to draw a conclusion.
While some critics will point to the 2018 draft class having regressed, it’s fair to explore how much of the coaching contributed to any "regression," especially since it's not just one or two players that appear to have stalled in their development, but rather a handful.
The other matter worth discussing is Gettleman's decision not to trade down last year and instead act on his fascination with running back Saquon Barkley.
While Barkley is considered a generational talent, last year in 984 offensive plays, he only touched the ball on 352 of them (35.7%).
That's not his fault. Still, how much better spent would that No. 2 overall pick have been if the team had traded down and acquired a few more picks, including an offensive lineman who plays on 95% or higher of the plays?
And how much wiser might it have been to take a running back in the later rounds, like the Saints (Alvin Kamara, third round) and Vikings (Dalvin Cook, second round) did?
Salary Cap Management
The draft and free agency go hand in hand as teams that build rosters the right way use the draft to build the foundation and free agency to supplement what the draft class lacks.
The Giants, though, have done this in reverse, using free agency as mulligans for picks that haven’t panned out. The ugly result is they overspend for players who, because of the lack of “premier” talent on the marketplace, can command high salaries despite not having years of consistent production to back it up.
Gettleman, to his credit, has put a heavy focus on cleaning up the team’s salary cap by dumping bloated contracts of players who don’t fit into the long-term picture. As previously noted, he got draft picks by trading defensive linemen Damon Harrison and Olivier Vernon, two such bloated contracts.
But the drawback of making these trades is that the team accumulates dead money. Since 2018, the Giants have averaged $42.429 million in dead money—money that’s on the books even though the players are no longer on the roster.
When you have multimillions ties up in the contracts of talent that's no longer available to you, that cuts into what you can spend on needed talent.
The purging of the bloated contracts was a necessary evil. Although this year's total of $43.897 million in dead money is higher than the $40.960 million from 2018, the good news is that the Giants are going to be in solid cap shape for 2020 (the final year of the existing CBA). They should also be in good shape for when they have to address second contracts for Barkley and quarterback Daniel Jones.
So Where Do They Go from Here?
At the end of the day, it's all about progress. In looking at the Giants, how much of the lack of progress is due to the coaching not getting the most out of the players?
How much of it is due to the roster cleanout that Gettleman put into motion? What about the injuries? And how many of pf the personnel decisions made or not made have cost this team a chance to progress?
There's not right or wrong answer, but what is definite is that Gettleman hasn't been perfect--no general manager ever is. But at the same time, he hasn't been the clueless fool that some have portrayed him to be.
FOX Sports Jay Glazer recently penned a mailbag column in which he opined, "I’m not so sure Dave Gettleman is going to be safe with the Giants."
While Glazer's batting average is the best in the business, it's hard to imagine the Giants ownership, which has craved stability in the past, going down the path of tearing everything down after only two years given the promise of the draft classes alone, which already puts Gettleman way ahead of his pedecessor.
But let's say they do jettison Gettleman. Is assistant general manager Kevin Abrams, who has been grooming for the head tole for years, the answer?
Or might the Giants deploy a tactic that they tried a few years ago whereby they brought in Martin Mayhew as a "special projects" executive to assist general manager Jerry Reese?
Or is that structure already in place given Gettleman's hire of Mark Koncz, with whom he worked in Carolina, as the Giants director of player personnel?
The answers to those questions will ultimately unveil themselves. Still, as far as grading Dave on his overall body of work, while the results haven't been what anyone has expected, a strong argument can be made that Gettleman, while not perfect, has done enough good things to warrant at least another season.
