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The Super Bowl is two weeks in the rear view mirror and the 49ers managed to lose - thankfully. Like how the Seahawks entered 2019 with a 6-1-heavy scheme aimed to stop the 11 personnel wide zone of the Los Angeles Rams, Pete Carroll’s defensive approach will take note and adjust to ways teams managed to nerf the 21 personnel of the new NFC Champion. There is much to learn from how the Kansas City defeated Seattle's arch nemesis in Miami.

Questions over Jimmy Garoppolo’s status as an NFL franchise quarterback better than the dreaded purgatory of Andy Dalton status only intensified after the Super Bowl loss. Most revealing was the mass highlighting of the cap savings that John Lynch can create for his team if he cuts Garroppolo this offseason, a potential plunge into quarterback hell. The #NickMullensDidNothingWrong campaign gained more supporters with Garoppolo struggling under pressure, particularly when blitzed.

Similar to how Garoppolo melted down at the end of Week 10 versus the Seahawks, the signal caller flat-out missed open targets in the big game. This happened on critical downs, with star tight end George Kittle visibly frustrated at the lost opportunities.

The nadir of woeful Garoppolo was the needless, thoughtless, brainless decision to force a wobbly second down throw into coverage with rushers in his face and his eyes closed. The lack of faith that Kyle Shanahan had in his quarterback was clearly illustrated in the end of half situation, where the offensive genius took time off the clock and passed up a genuine two-minute drill in favor of jarring conservatism. It was the lamest edition of reactive play calling.

The Chiefs gave up similar explosive runs to that of the Seahawks - when a team gets into the Super Bowl with a quarterback as patchy and robotic as Garoppolo, their rushing attack must be elite. Shanahan’s layers, counters, and diverse ground scheme were brutal for opposing defenses.

One nice element that Kansas City employed against the various San Francisco ghost, fly, and end-around motions was to spin their safeties with it, allowing their defensive front to worry about the box run and leave the ultra wide perimeter stuff to the back end.

This is an approach the Seahawks have taken in previous years, with Earl Thomas excelling at this tracking, but Seattle could never quite achieve it in 2019. Too often, the linebackers were hesitant about perimeter stuff that should not have been their responsibility.

What caught my eye was how the Chiefs played a favorite concept of the 49ers: gun stretch-slant RPO. San Francisco enjoyed this play and dressed it up with various shotgun formations. It initially appeared that Garoppolo had the option to hand the ball off to the tailback on the stretch run or pull the football and throw the slant to the backside - either to a slot receiver or an outside target.

The Seahawks fell victim to the play design. It wasn't a freak occurrence either. If Garoppolo had executed better, the 49ers would have completed the passing concept even more. It exploits the outside leverage the Seahawks ask their corners to play with, sucking the second level to the outside flow and hitting the in-breaking route beneath the third level. The free safety is then left with a difficult tackle coming downhill against a fast route underneath and across. The play was most potent when Mychal Kendricks was down at the line of scrimmage and not capping a slot receiver, as exhibited in both matchups between the Seahawks and 49ers.

In Week 10, Garoppolo completes the RPO slant pattern and Quandre Diggs misses the tackle.

In Week 10, Garoppolo completes the RPO slant pattern and Quandre Diggs misses the tackle.

In Week 17, Garoppolo completes the slant pattern and Lano Hill misses the tackle in space.

In Week 17, Garoppolo completes the slant pattern and Lano Hill misses the tackle in space.

On the first instance of Kansas City facing the play, they were forced to show their middle-of-field-closed man defense pre-snap after a receiver shift. By blitzing a linebacker through the B-Gap bubble of over, defensive coordinator Steve Spagnuolo had the linebacker to occupy the guard, preventing him from climbing to the second level. This is something that the 49ers' offensive line excels at.

More importantly, the linebacker blitz to the backside B-Gap freed up the backside defensive end to play the quarterback and occupy the slant window. This was a better angle than a SAM linebacker, from a player assigned to rush the quarterback rather than having to worry about coverage depth.

Linebacker blitzing the guard frees the defensive end.

Linebacker blitzing the guard frees the defensive end.

However, Tanoh Kpassagnon got overly hungry and went upfield for Garoppolo rather than remaining patient. The slant was completed for 11 yards to Deebo Samuel following a physical release inside.

Shanahan rightly came back to the concept on his opening second half drive. This looks a pre-snap RPO based on the coverage look that the defense gives Garoppolo. I write that because after the motion of a receiver was followed by Tyran Mathieu, potentially hinting at zone, Garoppolo handed the football off. Moreover, the receivers did not run their routes like they were expecting the football.

Calling a defense that features the multifaceted skill set of Mathieu is fun though, because you can trust him to play man on receivers. Whether the coverage was man or zone is hard to tell. Defenses should deny offenses basic pre-snap coverage identification more regularly, yet that's a topic for another day.

If Garoppolo was reading the slant read post-snap, the picture he was given screamed HAND THE BALL OFF. Mathieu stayed over the top of the half-hearted slant stem, looking ready to break with it.

Clark gets himself in the slant window.

Clark gets himself in the slant window.

Spagnualo again called an over front with the linebacker blitzing the backside B-Gap bubble; once more, Frank Clark was free to play the quarterback and slant window. This time, Clark stayed tighter and more patient, waiting for the slant first.

They achieve numbers frontside.

They achieve numbers frontside.

With the football in the hands of Tevin Coleman, running a stretch play designed to go ultra wide, the Chiefs were put in a winning position. Their over front got numbers front-side and clean bodies into the backfield. However, the 49ers were so accomplished at avoiding negative running plays in 2019. Coleman managed to wriggle past the inside move of linebacker Reggie Ragland and earn four positive yards.

The Seahawks would enjoy similar success utilizing these tactics to halt this play. Get into over and do something to allow the backside end to contain even versus stretch away! When Kendricks or the other curl-flat defender is left in that position, they have outside coverage to worry about too. They can't attack the mesh point, nor can they play purely in the slant window.

The lone time Seattle stopped this play was from Jadeveon Clowney being the backside end, instantly shedding his block and getting properly in the slant window thanks to him winning wide. This was a tantalizing tease of what is possible.

Clowney totally obstructs the slant window.

Clowney totally obstructs the slant window.

Shaquill Griffin achieved a physical re-route on the slant, but if Clowney isn't in the window, Garoppolo still throws the in-breaker. Instead, the quarterback got sacked by Al Woods at a critical point in the game.

For Kansas City or Seattle, the above "wins" are still based around defenses driven by the mindset of stopping the run first. Most defensive coordinators would rather stop the football on the ground and force what they view as a lower percentage passing play.

Yet passers have become so good at throwing RPO routes that this approach feels outdated - just look how Garoppolo is able to change his release angle to thread it through the open slant window.

A less conventional play to the RPOs that aim to hit the second and third levels of the defense is therefore to force the quarterback into handing the ball to the running play. This is the new wave.

We should finish with the fact that, in the Super Bowl, the Chiefs didn't try anything revolutionary overall. The Seahawks came mighty close, an inch to be exact, from doing the double over the 49ers and winning the NFC West. Talent remains the major difference.