Film Breakdown: Analyzing Seahawks Busted Pressure Coverages
It’s been two weeks since I wrote about the Seahawks defense failing to play assignment-sound football. The unit has improved, holding the Rams to a six-point second half and doing better than anyone anticipated against the Cardinals - well, almost anyone.
Much has been made of the accountability meeting under pressure defensive coordinator Ken Norton Jr held prior to the Thursday Night Football victory. Rightly so. Things have noticeably sharpened up, yet certain coverage busts have still continued and accountability has not been met across the board. (My pre-game prediction was only half-right) This is massively frustrating with Seattle still gift-wrapping early Christmas presents to opposing offenses. Though coverages have been blown with less regularity, it is still unacceptable.
Over the last two games, a distinct theme to the blown assignments has emerged. Each time Seattle has messed up, they have been attempting to pressure or blitz. Sending five or more players at the quarterback adjusts coverage rules and stresses communication to a different degree and area.
This play was used as ammunition for criticizing Norton. Frankly, that’s like taking a nerf gun into a real life warzone. It’s ineffectual, weak, and should get you killed. Yes, Seattle ran the exact same pressure they showed before the delay of game. However, there’s a strong chance the Seahawks - if not getting the sack via the additional pass rusher - wanted to encourage the screen pass given their shaky cornerback group, which included a D.J. Reed debut at left outside corner.
The real issue was Seattle’s execution. They were sending Jamal Adams through the b-gap on a fire zone, five-man pressure featuring an overloaded defensive line. In the delay of game example, you can see that K.J. Wright is responsible for the #2 player in his hot to #2 technique. It was three-deep, three-under fire zone coverage.
The 3D, 3U firezone before the delay of game
However, after the five-yard penalty was imposed on the Rams’ offense, Sean McVay presented what was likely the same concept - a slip screen - slightly differently. Rather than coming out in an 11 personnel, 2x2 set, he aligned his offense in a 3x2 empty formation via the same personnel, then shifted the No. 3 receiver from the boundary into the field. Wright communicated with a hand signal.
The shift of the #3 receiver with K.J. Wright communicating
Post-motion, Wright played a middle hook that totally ignored the weak No. 2 receiver and was more focused on the trips bunch. No one covered Malcolm Brown. Jared Goff completed the pass to Brown, the No. 2 receiver, and picked up the easiest first down of his season. What a cheap 11 yards!
Jamal Adams blitzed the open B-Gap, K.J. Wright played the middle hook, but no one covered the Weak #2
For a 10-year veteran of Wright’s ability and playing level to do this, he clearly expected the defensive end, Rasheem Green, to peel off to play the weak No. 2 receiver. This is often a fire zone coverage check to empty formations. Green engaged what looked like chip protection from Brown and then attacked on a pass rush.
This was a highly conservative McVay play call, mainly looking to get into better distance for the kicker. Yet the coach, via his shift, got an added bonus of total Seahawks failure. If Seattle’s execution had featured a Hot No. 2 player to that side - as is designed - then I’m sure the Seahawks would have rallied to stop the screen short of the required nine yards. Goff may even have been forced to hold the ball. It is the hot No. 2 defenders job to remove the quick throw to that player! The defense would have got off the field, forcing a field goal try. Instead, the Rams went on to score a touchdown.
Pressures are designed to have in-built answers to screen passes - they’re one thing a defense can expect to happen. Given they are getting after the quarterback, a quick throw to a protected player which capitalizes on the additional rushers and less back-end numbers makes total sense. The Seahawks failed to implement their solution to this most obvious of answers.
It was more disappointing that a three-and-out forcing, Kyler Murray diminishing defense still made basic execution errors. The Cardinals struggled throughout the game and essentially relied on penalties to stay in touching distance. Yet there was a Seattle pressure coverage bust that helped Arizona.
Defending 3rd and goal, Seattle decided to call what looked like a man blitz. You can guess this coverage was supposed to be man from their pre-snap alignment alone, with Reed at outside corner travelling to the slot receiver while leaving the nub tight end to strong safety Jamal Adams.
Tre Flowers communicated the four-strong, trips bunch check, while D.J. Reed traveled and DeAndre Hopkins aligned in the backfield
Arizona aligned their running back at the No. 3 receiver position. Importantly, DeAndre Hopkins aligned in the backfield to the strong side, allowing them to release four receiving threats to one side of the pattern.
The trips bunch and four-strong look saw Tre Flowers communicate a coverage check. With the running back fast to the flat, the corner took this threat. This could have been a red zone matching version of zone. As the point man, Ugo Amadi took the No. 2 receiver up before breaking off to No. 1’s corner. D.J. Reed picked up the No. 2 receiver.
The issue happened between Quandre Diggs and Adams playing the mesh pattern. Diggs let the No. 3 receiver run shallow across the middle and seemed more interested in Hopkins coming out of the backfield. Meanwhile, Adams let the nub tight end run shallow, then turned his eyes to the backfield and started coming downhill. There was no low hole help as Bobby Wagner blitzed on the snap of the ball.
The mesh combination got wide open for the Arizona Cardinals with Jamal Adams sucked downwards
Adams played with a laissez-faire freelancing symbolic of a man who thought Wright had the tight end in man. Instead Wright was an add-on blitzer, possibly clearing the threat of the tight end inside, possibly moving to contain a potential designed Murray run to the left of Seattle’s tite front. As with the most egregious of busts, it’s difficult to fully work this one out but I’d guess it’s a Cover 0 check to four strong trips bunch.
The confusion between the safeties resulted in a butt-naked touchdown for Murray to hit. Yes, Hopkins starting the play in the backfield and the formation being four strong undoubtedly stressed the Seahawks. However, with better communication this bust would have been avoided. At the end of the play, Adams was visibly bewildered and turned to Diggs. Maybe Adams expected a call from Diggs that never came? Either way, he should have looked for work as soon as he released the tight end underneath.
After the play: Jamal Adams asking Quandre Diggs what was going on
Asked in his Week 12 press conference about what went well for the defense in the Arizona victory, Adams answered, “Just execution, communication, that’s what it’s about when it comes to defense man.”
The other pressure bust from Thursday Night Football came with 2:01 left to play in the game. The Cardinals looked to get one last play off before the two-minute warning and the Seahawks got ultra risky. Seattle ended up sending seven blitzers from their even, double A-gap front after Murray, leaving Flowers totally alone against two displaced receivers. While to the field and to the stack they played classic three-deep, three-under fire zone principles, there was no hot to No. 2 defender playing to the boundary.
Tre Flowers was left all alone
You’d presume the hot 2 defender was supposed to be Adams, given that Wright had the running back as the hot 3 player and Wagner was sugaring the other A-Gap. This bust may also be a result of a broken play calling system in hurry up situations that is not getting a consistent message across to the players. The Seahawks were very lucky this only went for six yards.
There are other things to look at asides from the coaching staff still failing to fix this issue and a potential problem with how pressures and blitzes are called in. Adams has been underrated in coverage this year. He is particularly excellent in underneath zone coverage, with active range and rapid processing.
However, the 25-year old can be blamed for both of the busts against the Cardinals. Adams’ comments about his relationship with Pete Carroll contained some hints at what may be creating this problem. It’s hard not to picture that fourth quarter bust when reading this.
“He teaches me a lot,” Adams said last Friday, “He wants me to be free, a little bit more, and I’m trying to get used to that. Just trusting my instincts at times. Because you know, again, I’m still learning everything.”
What if Seattle is letting Adams add on to certain pressures if he himself sees the opportunity to make a play? That would explain the way he approached both of those defensive errors versus the Cardinals. Clearly, the balance still needs work. And, pass rush-needy or not, it does feel risky to stress Adams in this manner before he is fully comfortable within the base pass coverages.
The final issue is one that remains from my last article on coverage busts. There is a lack of continuity amongst the defensive backs. Quality coverage does require chemistry. Nevertheless, the most basic of execution is still more a question of professionalism and accountability than one of team cohesion and understanding. The defense has starting executing better. Let’s hope they can eradicate these pressures busts too.
