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Film Breakdown: Analyzing Seahawks Pass Coverage Busts Against Bills

When it comes to the Seahawks defense, most of the criticism has been directed to defensive coordinator Ken Norton Jr. While this is warranted to an exten, after watching the tape, Matty F. Brown has identified a far bigger problem: coverage busts. These lead to blame for a different coach.

The Seahawks’ defense is failing to meet the most basic of football necessities. From Pee Wee ranks to the NFL, from scrambling around in the back yard to playing under the bright lights, one truth remains constant: successful football cannot happen without every single player being on the same page.

This is especially true of the defense. On the other side of the ball, a receiver can run a route of low importance incorrectly and the opposition can be none the wiser. On the defense, all 11 men are tied together by meticulously developed rules tested by the time of coaching trees, film room sessions, and playing. Bill Belichick has managed to make “Do Your Job” his own, but it’s a slogan that should be the driving mantra of any defensive unit.

It’s this inability to consistently play with the correct alignment, assignment, and technique that explains why the Seahawks defense is so sickeningly bad. The most basic of metrics outlines just how putrid: Seattle is on pace to allow 5,794 passing yards, almost 1,000 yards more than the previous high of the 2011 Green Bay Packers (4,796). This isn’t just the worst defense of 2020 - it’s playing the worst defense of all time.

While much was made earlier in the year about pass rush issues, the pass coverage has been the true anchor for Seattle's ineptitude. Yes, there have been talent discrepancies. However, the biggest thing - and what we’ll focus on - is the repeated execution errors that have made watching this unit a dreadful experience full of worry and shame.

The Bills were the first team to come out throwing against the Seahawks and never stop. (That says a lot about the flawed attitude and standard of NFL coaching, but that’s a different subject.) Buffalo enjoyed the fruits of this approach - an apple here, a banana there - but they were also handed bonus morsels from Seattle coverage busts.

14:51 First Quarter

The defense’s first play on the field saw D.J. Reed bust his buzz underneath zone with Seattle in Cover 3 Sky. Rather than getting to the numbers and underneath No. 1, his eyes were drawn to the No. 3 pivot route which Bobby Wagner was covering well in the strong hook.

D.J. Reed left No. 1 free and covered No. 3's pivot route, which Bobby Wagner had covered in the strong hook

D.J. Reed left No. 1 free and covered No. 3's pivot route, which Bobby Wagner had covered in the strong hook

With cornerback Quinton Dunbar correctly moving over to the #2 receiver down the seam in his Zebra 1/3, the #1 receiver was open on the hitch route of the HOSS Y-Juke concept. This was particularly bad from Reed given he had quarterback eyes towards him throughout the rep.

13:41 First Quarter

Shortly afterwards, the defense busted Cover 3 again. These are core coverage concepts that are basic and should never be so mistake-ridden.

With the Bills coming out in 2x2 and then shifting to a 3x1 formation, the Seahawks looked to communicate their coverage check in response to the new look. Typically, Seattle asks their weak hook player to play the No. 3 receiver up, man-turning the route deep. In this case, that was the down safety Jamal Adams. This allows the high safety to cheat over to the No. 2 receiver, flooding the coverage.

Jamal Adams tried to check the coverage to Tre Flowers post-motion

Jamal Adams tried to check the coverage to Tre Flowers post-motion

Yet, Adams was clearly trying to check into a different coverage pre-snap. With the ball snapped, Adams instead played the narrow receiver split of the weak No. 1, completely ignoring the No. 3 receiver on the other side. It seems like he played an “area” call, expecting Tre Flowers to overlap the No. 3 receiver up with his No. 1 receiver shallow.

The issue was Flowers clearly didn’t get this call. Flowers thought Adams was playing the No. 3 receiver up still, so he played Read 1/3 technique and squeezed the curl of the No. 1 receiver.

Both Tre Flowers and Jamal Adams took the weak No. 1 hitch; this left touchdown space behind to No. 3 up

Both Tre Flowers and Jamal Adams took the weak No. 1 hitch; this left touchdown space behind to No. 3 up

The end result was a disappointed Quandre Diggs turning around to look at the pair after an uncovered No. 3 receiver caught an easy touchdown deep on the special route. This was far too easy - a gift-wrapped touchdown.

12:46 First Quarter

Reed played this game like he'd never been a nickel corner in the Seattle system. We of course know that he came from the Robert Saleh-coordinated 49ers, who use the same system. This was another poor rep from him, playing far too tight in his Cover 4 curl to empty.

In his curl drop, D.J. Reed was already too tight and lost track of where No. 2 was

In his curl drop, D.J. Reed was already too tight and lost track of where No. 2 was

Yes, middle field open curl technique asks the defender to maintain inside eyes on the No. 2 receiver in your drop while staying in the seam. But at a certain point Reed needed to widen with the quarterback drop, squeeze to No. 2 and stay aware of the pattern distribution - particularly in Cover 4. 

D.J. Reed left No. 2 open by the numbers, with his eyes getting stuck to No. 3

D.J. Reed left No. 2 open by the numbers, with his eyes getting stuck to No. 3

Wagner had the No. 3 route covered as the middle linebacker. Reed left the No. 2 out-and-up route further outside uncovered for a 15-yard throw. This was his responsibility.

6:05 Second Quarter

Seattle started getting into more man coverage looks because they couldn’t trust their zone coverage nor stop the hot throws when sending zone pressure. Josh Allen knew pre-snap he was facing man on this snap thanks to the pre-snap shift to 3x2 Empty. It was Cover 1 Rat.

The Buffalo mesh combination and how the Seahawks should have cut it

The Buffalo mesh combination and how the Seahawks should have cut it

This mesh route combination was busted by Jamal Adams. With spare man Bobby Wagner as the rat cutting the first shallow route of Cole Beasley, Adams needed to replace Wagner in the low hole. Instead, Adams kept running with his man Beasley.

Jamal Adams kept running with Cole Beasley; he should have left this to Bobby Wagner and helped D.J. Reed.

Jamal Adams kept running with Cole Beasley; he should have left this to Bobby Wagner and helped D.J. Reed.

This left Reed, who thought he had coverage help in the low middle of the field, without anyone. Adams should have been there to cut Stefon Diggs. Instead, Reed was a step behind with no help and Diggs got 21 yards on the deeper route of the mesh combination.

13:34 Third Quarter

Quinton Dunbar should not have been on the field in this game - I covered that in my coaching issues article. The Bills threw a ton of hitch and comeback routes at both Seahawks cornerbacks. This play action saw Dunbar bite on the hitch in Cover 3 buzz. The corner vacated his deep 1/3, resulting in a 39-yard roasting.

Quinton Dunbar breaking down on a curl route that wasn't there

Quinton Dunbar breaking down on a curl route that wasn't there

1:50 Third Quarter

The Seahawks grew intent on sending heavy pressure and heat at Allen. Perhaps they were hoping to force turnovers and register negative plays. On this 1st and 10, they instead busted another coverage.

Seattle was in their Nickel 3-3-5 “Joker” package, an odd front with sugared linebackers. They were showing man coverage but instead went for a rare 3-deep, 2-under blitz of Adams, K.J. Wright, and Jordyn Brooks.

The three linebackers in the 3-3-5 "Joker" package

The three linebackers in the 3-3-5 "Joker" package

In pressure schemes, there has to be someone pealing with the running back to avoid getting screened. Yet here, no defender pealed with the running back. With Wagner carrying the No. 3 receiver up as though he was a hot to No. 3 player, Wright was likely the hot to No. 2 player - this would task him with the running back and therefore place the fault on his shoulders. He got lost in the trash and was unable to play 3-deep, 3-under as called. Brooks could certainly have been more aware though.

Bobby Wagner playing No. 3 up, where is the hot No. 2 player for the running back?

Bobby Wagner playing No. 3 up, where is the hot No. 2 player for the running back?

It was a clever offensive design in that Zack Moss changed sides on the slip screen, but with assignment sound football the Seahawks would not have given up a 20-yard pitch-and-toss on the play.

Josh Allen ended the game with 31 of 38 passes completed for 415 yards and three passing touchdowns. Rarely was the third-year quarterback forced to progress from his first read. The six busts above amount to 126 yards, five first downs, and one touchdown.

A ready-made excuse for the mistakes would be a lack of familiarity in the defensive backfield. Indeed, Adams was playing in just his fourth game as a Seahawk, Flowers was in at right corner, and Dunbar had to switch to the left side for the injured, first string Shaquill Griffin. The projected first string unit heading into 2020 has only played around six quarters of football together. As we have seen, communication and understanding is vital.

The continuity excuse is inadequate though. This is the NFL. Injuries are a part of the process and these coverage busts are a theme of the entire season. Chemistry of Cover 3 zone defense can be developed -  flat-out busts are inexcusable. Check out the lowlight reel, which proves this isn’t a singular player, a specific grouping, or a freak occurrence.

The Seahawks fanbase has understandably moved towards a “fire Ken Norton Jr” mindset. However, the man who is primarily responsible for the coverage - at least according to the team’s official website - is passing game coordinator Andre Curtis. Pressure on him to halt the errors is peaking now. The players themselves are the ones who are ultimately responsible, busting the basics in addition to some more complex stuff, but changing a whole unit is more difficult than changing one man.

The above shows the futility in blaming one individual for the collective failings. There’s multiple issues at play here, asides from the busts. Those singular problems, like the busts, are caused by various factors. There isn’t a simple, fix-all solution to the abysmal Seattle defense. Pete Carroll will believe that overcoming this adversity together will benefit the team in the long run. A good starting point would be playing assignment-sound football. Time is fast running out.