Putting Francisco Lindor Under the Microscope Using Infield Outs Above Average, Statcast's New Toy

We already knew Francisco Lindor was a plus defender at shortstop. He might not be in the Andrelton Simmons stratosphere of all-time great defenders, but he’s certainly well above average, and every metric we had at our disposal — including the age-old eye test — told a similar story of his ability to pick it at one of the most important positions on the field.

But then MLB Statcast revealed their newest toy this week, Infield Outs Above Average, offering yet another reason to delay things we should be doing in favor of salivating over the new data and what to make of it. Our Alex Hooper already took a dive into the tool earlier this week, examining the difference at second base between former Indians infielder Jason Kipnis and free-agent newcomer Cesar Hernandez, but given the numbers released this week over at Baseball Savant, it made sense to put Lindor under the microscope in an attempt to further quantify what makes him special (you know, before they do something wild like trade him).

Now, before we continue, it’s recommenced to check out Mike Petriello’s article on the new tool, or, if you’re really feeling adventurous, read Tom Tango’s work on the specifics.

What makes IOAA fun, though, is that it incorporates some of the elements that had been previously difficult to account for in past metrics like UZR or defensive runs saved. Statcast’s version takes into account things like where the infielder was standing on the field when he made the play. Was the third baseman shifted, playing where the shortstop typically does? And what is the average sprint speed of that runner moving down the baseline? The difference between Roberto Perez and Oscar Mercado is ... uhhh ... tangible, so grading every play as if the runner was the same is less than ideal when we’ve got the data.

The ability to bring those elements consistently into the fold gives us more of the puzzle, also adding how far the fielder has to go to retrieve the ball at the “intercept point” and how much time he’s got to get there.

As for Lindor, the Tribe shortstop ended up with the 11th-most infield outs above average (11) in 2019, ranking seventh among all shortstops in baseball despite playing in about 20 fewer games than each of the past four seasons due to injury.

And here is how Statcast grades Lindor’s past three seasons compared to defensive runs saved and ultimate zone rating.

2019: 11 IOAA, 9 DRS, 6.4 UZR

2018: 12 IOAA, 15 DRS, 14.1 UZR

2017: 8 IOAA, 5 DRS, 6.5 UZR

Really good, particularly over the past two years. Just a shade below elite.

In other words: Yup. A real shocker. The new data pretty much confirms every bit of the previous numbers and narratives. And while that doesn't lead to some dramatic, mind-melting reveal fit for an M. Night Shyamalan film, there's nothing wrong with additional confirmation that comes from a new perspective.

Now, here's where it gets really fun.

The new IOAA data also assigns each fielder a success rate and estimate success rate, offering an indication of the typical difficulty each player faced compared to their actual ability to turn those chances into outs. Lindor, to his credit, finished tied for the second-lowest estimated success rate (85 percent) among qualified shortstops — think play difficulty — successfully converting 88 percent of those plays for a success rate added of 3 percent.

Gasp! The numbers like another part of Lindor’s game.

But the data doesn’t end there. The new IOAA tool also allows us to break down each fielder’s plays into a heat map of where each of his chances occurred and how successful he was at each spot on the field. Using that, we can see if a player struggled or excelled when starting the chance at an unusual spot, and perhaps that data can help teams better position those defenders in the future.

For context, the size of each box represents the number of chances that came on each play's individual starting position, while the shade of red or blue indicate the outs above average at those positions. When broken down by field location, we can see the only place Lindor was below average last year was during the 34 chances while standing on the second base side of the bag in the shift.

Interesting enough, Lindor was actually at his best last year when moving laterally toward the first base bag, collecting +8 of his IOAA moving directly to his left. He also finished with +3 when forced to charge or come in for a chance. The only direction in which Lindor failed to finish with a positive OAA was when moving back, docked -2 when forced to retreat.

Overall, the data paints a picture that shows very few weak spots, and any that may have been present during his +8 IOAA season of 2017 appeared to have been tidied up. He even managed to record a pair of outs on chances that Statcast assigned an estimated success rate of 0 percent, something he had done just once prior to the start of the 2019 campaign.

Now, it’s also important to remember that simply generating outs above average doesn’t necessarily indicate a player is better or worse than another player. Fewer overall chances could limit a player’s OOA total, and a player that sees more difficult grounders automatically has an increased chance to net more value. For instance, Indians pitchers allowed the second-lowest ground ball rate in 2019, so Tribe infielders didn’t see as many chances to inflate (or deflate) their totals as say the Rockies, who finished with the highest ground ball percentage. This is why examining a player’s success rate added can be just as helpful, telling us the rate of plays made or not made when compared to what is estimated.

Those factors add to the nuance that will always likely exist when it comes to assigning defensive value to players, but it does appear that Statcast’s version of Infield Outs Above Average gives us the most complete picture to date.

Of course, this is just scratching the surface of what can be deciphered with this tool — we’re just getting started — but even without looking too far under the hood, we can start to utilize it and understand how and where each player is generating their defensive value.

When it comes to Lindor, much like his overall game, it comes from a little of everywhere, just as we expected.