Steven Bisig-USA TODAY Sports
All 22 Review: 49ers' Super Bowl Defense Shows Where Seahawks Must Improve This Offseason
In addition to the Super Bowl matchup between the 49ers offense and Chiefs defense providing lessons for the Seahawks, Seattle can also learn from the opposite encounter. San Francisco’s defensive approach against the dynamite Kansas City attack contained interesting elements for the schematic future of the Seahawks as they delve deep into the 2020 offseason. Most notable? The pass coverages of Cover 3 “Buzz” and Cover 4 “Poach.”
If you recall, the 49ers managed to contain Patrick Mahomes and company into the fourth quarter. The heralded Kansas City offense scored just 10 points in 53 minutes. Then the Chiefs, in a fashion that would get Pete Carroll giddy, managed to win the game in the fourth quarter. We’ll come to that moment. First, let’s talk about the majority of the big event.
In the build-up to Super Bowl 54, there was concern over San Francisco’s ability to successfully play Cover 3 against the Chiefs. “Mahomes produced a downfield completion [20 or more air yards] on 6.8 percent of his qualifying drop backs — the second-highest mark in the league,” highlighted The Athletic ‘s Sheil Kapadia. “This is one of the few areas where the 49ers were mediocre during the regular season. They ranked 12th in DVOA against deep passes.” Furthermore, the Chiefs led the NFL in passing EPA against a Cover 3 defense with 61.9.
Robert Saleh’s mixture of “3 Buzz” and “4 Poach” deserves credit. It largely negated the heavy trips usage of Kansas City, halting the four-strong passing concepts that Andy Reid loves. The defenders played their vertical matches against the blistering receivers Tyreek Hill, Mecole Hardman, and Demarcus Robinson from serious depth. The rapid mismatch for the 49ers on the back end was not exposed.
“3 Buzz” is a 3-deep, 4-under zone defense that has one safety rotate down, inside, to one of the four underneath zones. The 49ers ran "3 Weak Buzz," meaning that the down safety rotated into the hook away from the passing strength. This hook safety was assigned with matching the final No. 3 receiver vertically. Versus “All-Go Special” (four verts), this safety matched the bender route of the No. 3 receiver. The read for the final 3 match safety is flat-footed, patient, and located near the hash.
Going backward to the three deep zones, San Francisco shaded their deep middle third safety to the No. 2 receiver, a lean post technique. With the down safety handling the seam from the No. 3 receiver, this is a more efficient way of handling the other seam route from the No. 2 receiver.
On this Super Bowl 3rd and 12, Mahomes threw the football right to strong hook defender Fred Warner. The 49ers had over-the-top and underneath layers for the Chiefs’ passing concept. The defensive line managed to hurry Mahomes on the third and long too.
The basic premise.
The weak hook safety visibly looked for the over route from the final 3.
The perfect coverage layers of the 49ers were positioned to pounce on throws to the nestled vertical routes.
Arik Armstead achieved pressure despite the half-roll of Patrick Mahomes.
In addition to the lean-post technique protecting against the seam route of the No. 2 receiver, it also gives the Cover 3 pass defense - thought of as a middle of the field closed coverage - a middle of the field open feel. That, naturally, blends into “4 Poach” (some coaches call this “Solo”) and other Cover 4 pass defenses that are always considered to be middle of the field open, with no deep safety situated in the post.
“4 Poach” is a two-high coverage that has the trips-side corner and safety play their typical zone midpoints - quarter, quarter with the cornerback reading from No. 1 to No. 2. The high safety on the single receiver side looks to play the final No. 3 receiver from depth. The read is from the final 3 to the isolated single receiver. The backside safety only helps the isolated corner if there is no final 3 up in his area.
From the excellent Cody Alexander article on Poach/Solo, found here: https://matchquarters.com/2017/06/09/defending-3x1-formations-solo-coverage/
From the excellent Cody Alexander article on Poach/Solo, found here: https://matchquarters.com/2017/06/09/defending-3x1-formations-solo-coverage/
The basic premise.
Richard Sherman was able to look in after mugging his receiver. Once more, everything was covered with pressure arriving.
The apex defender to the three receiver side is one of the three underneath zones in “4 Poach.” For the 49ers, this was often nickel cornerback K’Waun Williams. Rather than pushing for width to the numbers, like the nickel would in their curl-flat assignment in “3 Buzz,” the defender plays with inside eyes on the No. 2 receiver.
A red zone edition which could have been "Reno."
Nothing was open as pressure arrived.
Criticism of Saleh for being predictable in his situational play calling came from Steven Ruiz of USA Today, who highlighted the tendencies of Saleh to play “4 Poach” on early downs and “3 Buzz” on third down. I’d counter with the pivotal 3rd and 15 play being more an example of the importance of pass rush - as opposed to the importance of avoiding predictability.
Against man coverage, Hill’s famous route still comes open. It does versus most match quarters concepts too. At a certain point, defense becomes futile when the quarterback has time to take a 15-step drop and can sling it effortlessly downfield. Patrick Mahomes is a ridiculous talent and can succeed even in what is supposedly a bad situation for the offense.
Only after remembering that “Gun Trey Right, 3 Jet Chips Wasp Y Funnel” beats the vast majority of pass defense can we then look at how it dissected “3 Buzz.” The vertical stem of strong No. 1 receiver Sammy Watkins was the key. Typically, against two or more receivers, Emmanuel Moseley would execute a “Zebra 1/3” that would have him midpoint the No. 1 and No. 2 receivers if both released vertically. Perversely, this would have covered Hill’s route.
Emmanuel Moseley clapped his fists to deep safety Jimmie Ward.
However, pre-snap Moseley appeared to check into a “Read 1/3” on the No. 1 receiver, playing Man On Deep. With No. 1 releasing vertically and running deep, Moseley followed and squeezed Watkins across the field. This was a vertical stem after all. It’s likely that Moseley was conscious of stopping the dagger/drive concept that, when run from trips, usually beats zone midpoint, “Zebra 1/3” technique. (More on this later)
The basic premise.
Moseley’s technique choice saw space left to his sideline and that third. Hill sold his over route from the No. 2 receiver alignment to the deep middle safety, Jimmie Ward, and then broke outwards to this space.
“The only [way] I was going to play that better is if I would’ve guessed,” Ward reflected to NBC Sports. “I didn’t have any choice. I had to open my hips because, 17 [Hardman] or 10 [Hill], even 14 [Watkins], you can’t let them run up on you. You have to flip your hips. If you don’t flip your hips, they’ll run past you.”
The 49ers technique check was wrong and their pass rush couldn’t get to the deepest quarterback drop they’ve seen all year. Mahomes bought himself enough time to fire the play in, getting hit by DeForest Buckner immediately after the release.
There was so much space for Tyreek Hill to the sideline; Patrick Mahomes had the right amount of time too.
“They were playing this kind of robber coverage all game long where the safety was coming down and kind of robbing all our deep cross routes, and we had a good play call on it where we had [Travis] Kelce do a little stutter deep cross,” Mahomes’ described post-game. “We had Tyreek getting one-on-one with that safety, but the biggest thing was we needed really good protection.”
This brings us to the Seahawks. Seattle has played “3 Buzz” to great success, particularly with the weak safety rotation. They’ve also run this coverage from serious depth with the lean-post technique too. They call this “Phoenix Check” when in nickel.
This is "Cover 3 Weak Sky." Nonetheless, notice the SAM in the weak hook matches No. 3's bender route.
In terms of their conceptually two-high answers to trips formations, Seattle typically favors a spot-drop Cover 6 (Quarter, Quarter, Half) defense, but they have played their own version of “4 Poach” called “Panther.” This contains a “palms” element if the offense comes out with two receivers to that side of the field. (Honestly, this is what the 49ers likely ran with disguise in the Super Bowl too)
Yet, the Seahawks had nowhere close to the pass rush talent or spacing to run these coverages that often. Certainly not near to the Super Bowl numbers of the 49ers, whose defensive line enabled them to get away with so much. San Francisco was able to dare Kansas City to run the football. With five first-round picks at the first level, their linebackers were afforded extra time to go through their reads and were kept clean versus the run.
The 49ers’ 2019 regular season pressure rate only placed 21st in the NFL, though this can partially be explained by Dee Ford missing five games with a hamstring injury. Their 3rd-best sack rate was more impressive. In the Super Bowl, against a Chiefs offensive line that finished 17th in pressure rate allowed, San Francisco’s quarterback hunters ate. (All figures from Sports Info Solutions) Defensive Rookie of the Year Nick Bosa obliterated left tackle Jake Fisher. Bosa had such a dominant season, he should have been a Defensive Player of the Year candidate.
This San Francisco middle of the field open defense of a Kansas City drive concept was the perfect illustration of how vicious pass rush helps coverage. The 1st and 10 route combination got open as designed, yet pressure flushed Mahomes from the pocket before he could hit the created opening. (If I were to guess the 49ers’ coverage, I’d say it was flooded Cover 3 Strong Buzz)
Kansas City's drive concept.
The deeper route of the drive concept, run by Travis Kelce, was very open with room for the Tight End to run.
Drive, which is essentially like the dagger that @cmikesspinmove wrote about brilliantly here, is going to come open eventually against the zone defenses that NFL teams run versus trips. It’s why the smart offensive minds of Andy Reid, Eric Bienemy, and Sean McVay like it. It’s why Moseley tried to play “Read 1/3," Man On Deep versus Kelce on that 3rd and 15.
As Mahomes told Peter King, “If [Moseley] doesn’t stay there, I throw that for the first down [to Kelce]... Once I saw Tyreek get 1-on-1 with the safety, I mean, that’s a matchup that I’m gonna take every time.”
Drive/dagger is especially nasty from condensed splits between the deeper route and the shallow route. One way of stopping it from a pass defense perspective is playing man coverage with a low hole defender, a rat, to obstruct the passing lane over the middle and wall the routes. You could also zone-match it with inside leverage from the slot defender.
Green Bay kept hitting the concept in Seattle’s divisional round loss at Lambeau Field. Playing “3 Buzz” from depth would have compensated for Bradley McDougald’s waning athleticism, yet the shallower in-breaking route would have come open—especially from the tightened receiver splits. The disappointing thing about that loss was the Seahawks not running "Cover 1 Rat"; they instead blitzed their low hole defender when running man coverage or used a potential low hole safety to bracket Davante Adams.
Above different schematic counters, drive and dagger concepts take time to develop, time that - as the 49ers demonstrated - can be too costly against a genuine pass rush. Being able to get pressure with four is like cooking with a properly sharp knife. Things become easy. Quarterbacks are forced to move from the pocket, the opening is lost, and the offensive coordinator is likely to cross the design off his call sheet. At which point, only the off-schedule greats can still succeed. Russell Wilson and Mahomes happen to be a select two.
This Matt Patricia quote, which I found in Ted Nguyen’s excellent Super Bowl preview for The Athletic, sums up the difficulty of playing such uniquely fantastic quarterbacks. “I certainly have calls that are good for if he [Mahomes] is going to scramble,” said Patrica after the Week 4, 34-30 home loss to the Chiefs. “If he goes back there and throws it vertical with some of the speed he has then I’m not going to be happy in some of those situations. We can only put so many guys in so many different areas.” Patricia chose to play bracket coverage to take away Kansas City’s blistering pace; Mahomes improvised and extended the play into a scrambling touchdown.
The Seahawks’ safety group in the 2020 season should be able to run all kinds of coverage. McDougald’s speed, never the fastest, is waning. Yet playing from the depth of “3 Buzz” and “4 Poach” would compensate for this decline. Moreover, if the play making and pace of Marquise Blair isn’t starting at safety in the next campaign, questions must be asked of the coaching staff. Blair, in limited action, displayed all the desired traits at the position. He just seemed unable to grasp the schematic intricacies of an NFL defense. Combining Blair with the skilled Quandre Diggs would give Seattle the versatile talent to comfortably vary from “3 Buzz” to “4 Poach." That would be exciting for the Seahawks.
This article proves that pass rush is a necessity though. It’s a problem that the key decision makers are well aware needs fixing. As a result, Seattle letting Jadeveon Clowney walk would be too risky of a gamble. The Front Office has to pay him. My sources tell me the Seahawks’ first offer to Clowney was $17 million per year. Seattle is, however, willing to go above that figure. This corresponds with the reporting of ESPN’s Jeremy Fowler, who told John Clayton on 710 ESPN Seattle that Clowney is projected a deal within the $18 million to $20 million per year range. What Clowney can do slightly more bulked up, aiming to play more of a 5-tech, solid-side end role, should be impressive.
The Seahawks must then supplement the long-term signing of Clowney with a pass rusher who wins wide, a LEO who aligns to the flex-side. A veteran candidate like Everson Griffen would be a massively exciting addition. Bruce Irvin, who had high 2019 pressure rate numbers, could return to the Pacific Northwest. In the draft, taking two pass rushers who win wide, players like Michigan’s Josh Uche, would enable Seattle to play pass coverage better suited to stopping the most explosive of offenses. That includes effectively running “3 Buzz” and “4 Poach.”
